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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper will attempt to articulate the relationship between education and freedom by exploring the nature of education 
and differentiating it from learning. However, I do not wish to tread the same path explored by R.S. Peters in his celebrated works 
of nearly 50 years ago (Peters, 1966). At that time the concern was to develop the conceptual implications of the meaning of the 
term ‘education’, especially in regard to its professed intrinsic value. But it seems to me that for us, in the twenty-first century, more 
incisive tools than conceptual analysis are needed. For one thing, in the mid-twentieth century (certainly in Great Britain) the 
importance and stature of education and the teaching profession was not something that was under serious challenge.1 And for 
another, Peters did not have to cope with the rise of what is best termed a learning ideology and its concomitant subject, the 
‘learner’. In contrast to this ideology, this paper seeks to re-establish the emancipatory credentials of education through the use of a 
conceptual apparatus whose provenance is outside that of ‘education’ whilst also being firmly philosophical. 
 
It is proposed to make use of Kant’s concept of freedom as it arises out of his distinction between the empirical and the 
intelligible. Thus my focus will be on the first Critique (i.e. the Critique of Pure Reason) rather than his Critique of Practical 
Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Many scholars in the philosophy of education have undertaken analyses 
of moral education and moral development using these latter two works as a starting point for their endeavours and have articulated 
the notion of Kantian autonomy that arises out of the employment of practical reason.2 My proposal is to start the analysis further 
back, as it were, because the analysis of freedom in the first Critique yields much richer fruits, or so I hope to show. 
 
The paper is in three sections. In the first (fairly brief) section I will suggest how learning and education can be distinguished 
and why it is important to do this. This section will stake out the appropriate conceptual territory in a fairly declarative way and my 
focus will, by and large, be on education at university level. In the second section I undertake a deeper analysis of Kant’s concept of 
freedom. This will take us into some of the entanglements of Kantian scholarship but I hope to navigate a reasonably clear path—a 
path which gives some clarity to those from a philosophy of education background without, I hope, straying too far from the bounds 
 
 
1 For example, in 1964 the Schools Council was set up by a civil servant, Derek Morrell, with the support of the 
Conservative Minister for Education, Edward Boyle. The Council was designed to influence policy and was 
teacher led. It was abolished by the Thatcher government in 1983 (see Plaskow, 1985). 
 
2 See, for example, Johnston, 2007; Moran, 2009; Gonza´lez, 2011; and Martin, 2011. 
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of acceptability as far as students of Kant are concerned. In the third section, equipped with suitable conceptual tools, I will re-visit 
and amplify some of the claims made in the first section. 
 
It is my hope to convince readers of the merits of an emancipatory concept of education but even if I do not succeed in doing 
this I am hopeful that my efforts may contribute to a fresh understanding of what Kant has to offer us today. Too often Kant is 
discussed (to be then fairly quickly dismissed) as the stern, conservative upholder of Duty underpinned by a categorical imperative 
that most find to be either problematic or just plain wrong. The Kant I wish to discuss is radical, challenging and, in his range, 
power and complexity, a philosopher for our times. 
 
EDUCATION AND LEARNING 
 
There are many forms and contexts of learning and there is no common feature that bind all these together. Learning that a 
close friend has died, learning how to drive, learning the basic geography of the resort I am holidaying in, learning that Plato’s 
works are far more challenging and problematic than might be surmised from reading the account of justice in the single work The 
Republic, learning that Polonius in Hamlet may not be a complete fool after all; there is nothing that unites these other than a 
generic act of ‘taking in’. Therefore for the purposes of this paper I will consider the kind of learning that is promoted through 
pedagogical methods, of varying degrees of rigidity and flexibility. This is the kind of learning that drives schooling in the UK and, 
at an increasing pace, learning in universities. In particular, I wish to propose that this kind of learning takes the form of a certain 
cognitive training which itself is a form of disciplining of the self (Foucault, 1980). For one of the crucial components of learning as 
training is the assumption that any learning has to be assessed, according to which assessment is necessary not simply as a method 
of confirming what has been learnt; assessment itself is a key part of the learning process, i.e. through undertaking assessment I 
achieve more learning than I would have done without assessment. The role played by assessment differentiates this cognitive 
training from other types of learning. For it is clear that assessment is not logically necessary for learning to take place; I may learn 
many things, including complex knowledge, without ever being assessed. Indeed, many individuals know perfectly well, through 
their own experience, that learning can take place in this manner. 
 
When the activity of learning as cognitive training is under consideration it is important to understand that no pedagogical 
method has any more favourable normative value than any other. For example, it makes no difference whether the pedagogy is 
transmissive or interactive; the only question is which is more effective as evidenced through assessment. The fact that students 
may favour a more ‘learner-centred’ approach may commend it simply because their learning may be more successful; but the fact 
that students willingly co-operate in their own cognitive training through a process of becoming responsible for their own learning 
does not alter the fact that they are merely actively participating in their own training in exactly the same way that a professional 
athlete may discuss on a weekly basis changes in her regimen with her personal trainer. Learning becomes a form of training when 
learning becomes transformed into a series of objectives (outcomes) that must be achieved. I stress again that a learner-orientated 
approach—the fact that students are employed in peer assessment or in the co-creation of assessment criteria and learning outcomes 
or in the evaluation of their teachers and tutors—does nothing to detract from the fact they are being trained. If students can be 
induced to train themselves then so much the better. 
 
A couple of examples of this cognitive training will suffice. In their book Teaching for Quality Learning at University, John 
Biggs and Catherine Tang introduce the idea of constructive alignment. This means that ‘the intended learning outcomes specify the 
activity that students should engage if they are to achieve the intended outcome as well as the content the activity refers to … the 
outcome statement thus specifies a verb that informs students how they are expected to change as a result of learning that topic’ 
(Biggs and Tang, 2011, pp. 97–98). The idea is that not only do learning outcomes drive the learning process, they also drive how 
something is to be learned by specifying how the learning is to take place. Through this alignment of learning activities with 
assessment and outcomes, as the authors themselves state, perhaps unwittingly, ‘the students are “entrapped” in this web of 
consistency optimising the chance that they will engage appropriate learning activities’ (p. 99). Like most modern pedagogues, 
Biggs and Tang advocate a form of constructivism in which students construct their own knowledge (pp. 22–23) but this means 
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nothing if students are obliged to ‘construct’ knowledge in accordance with learning outcomes laid down in advance. The mental 
activity of ‘construction’ is an unknown; nor does it need to be known since all that counts are the achieved outcomes.3 
 
Another example of the development of cognitive training schemes is the increasing importance placed on formative 
feedback. Here, the emphasis is on finely-grained, speedy comments which tell the student exactly what she needs to do to improve 
her marks next time. The shift in many universities from summative to formative assessment may be supported by reducing the 
number of exams that students take which, in some cases, may give students and teachers greater freedom; but this is less likely to 
be the case if the amount of overall assessment increases—for example, where courses are designed with regular assessable learning 
activities in which feedback is targeted and timely, using so-called ‘SMART’ criteria.4 The role of feedback is emphasised by 
Graham Gibbs in securing greater student engagement in learning: ‘the educational intervention in schools that has more impact on 
student learning than any other involves improving formative assessment and especially the provision of more, better and faster 
feedback on student work’ (Gibbs, 2010, p. 34). This message is driven home in a later publication aimed at helping universities in 
the development of their quality assurance documentation. It is recommended that universities record ‘how many times in three 
years students receive feedback on assignments; how many times this is “formative only”; total volume of feedback in words; total 
volume of one-to-one, face-to-face feedback on assignments, in hours’ (Gibbs, 2012, p. 16).5 
 
I have taken my two examples from university (higher education) pedagogy deliberately. Schools in the UK have long been 
subject to learner ideology (it was heralded by the 1988 Education Act). The fact that universities are now subject to a similar 
regimen shows how extensive is its reach. 
 
There is, of course, nothing inherently ‘bad’ about cognitive training; indeed, it has much to recommend it for all kinds of 
socially and economically valuable pragmatic reasons. My point, however, is that it is a diminished form of education. For 
education designates an activity consisting of the initiation of enquiry in which there is nothing that cannot be put to question. 
Therefore education must include, as a central component, a critique of all that has been learnt and, indeed, consists in the active 
dissolution and re-building of learning. The object of educative enquiry could well consist of both the objects of learning—its 
content—and the process of learning as well. For too much learning may inhibit free enquiry the purpose of which is to disrupt 
learning. It is one of the paradoxes of education, if not the central paradox, that learning is required, only for that learning to be 
questioned. But learning by itself subjects nothing to question. Indeed, as we can see, the purpose (unintended or otherwise) of 
constructive alignment is precisely to close off critique. 
 
The paradox of education should not be seen as a mere ‘effect’ of an activity engaged in continual self-displacement in the 
way that post-structuralists might see the ‘play’ of education and learning. It is not as if in some way learning brings forth education 
as its other, or that education through its own activity engenders learning, the very thing that undermines it. Despite the attractions 
of exploring the education/learning duality in this way something is lost if too much is made of it. For it must be remembered that 
what drives education and is at its very heart is the free agent—radically free if it is the case that anything can be put to question. 
We can see why it is that learning, as I have described it, is such a threat to education. For the individual learner, entrapped as she is 
in the web of consistency, cannot be free in any radical sense. Such a person is incapable of putting anything to question at all: such 
an activity is neither expected nor encouraged. If these were ‘normal’ times, in which education was not under threat, one might 
indeed construe the relationship between learning and education as one of play. One might indeed see the individual as taking on 
the identity of learner on the one hand, and of radical enquirer on the other, with all the enjoyment that the constructing and 
 
 
 
 
3 The book by Biggs and Tang is now in its fourth edition and is prominent in most UK university pedagogic 
programmes for academics. 
4 Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, time-bound. 
 
5 Graham Gibbs has been an influential consultant for UK universities for many years. The publisher of the two 
pamphlets cited, the Higher Education Academy is now subscribed to by almost all UK universities and 
publications like these are widely read and digested at all levels in many universities in the UK. 
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displacing of identities can involve. But these are not normal times: it is the identity of the learner and the activity of learning as 
cognitive training that dominate.6 
 
KANT’S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
 
I have stressed the idea of freedom in relation to education and have suggested earlier that Kant’s account is pertinent to this 
topic. It is to this that I must now turn. Kant’s idea of freedom derives from his distinction between the empirical and the 
intelligible. In the Critique of Pure Reason he says: 
 
‘… a subject belonging to the sensible world (would) have, first, an empirical world, whereby its actions, as appearances, stand in thoroughgoing connection with 
other appearances in accordance with unvarying laws of nature … Secondly, we should also have to allow the subject an intelligible character, by which it is indeed 
the cause of those same actions as appearances, but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not itself appearance’ (Kant, 1933, 
A539/B567 p. 468). 
 
Kant goes on to explain that in the capacity of intelligibility, humankind possesses the faculties of reason and understanding 
and the former (namely reason) enables us to formulate ideas and has its own causality. Thus whereas the understanding is 
deployed as the essential mechanism for converting appearances into objects, the role of reason is a realm of genuine spontaneity. It 
is unconditioned and is directed towards the formulation of human ends and the creation of ideas. He explains that freedom is not 
simply to be viewed ‘negatively’ as merely independent of empirical conditions because this would mean that it would ‘cease to be 
the cause of appearances’. Consequently, ‘it must also be viewed in positive terms, as the power of originating a series of events’ 
and as such can initiate ‘a beginning in a series of appearances’ (A554/B582, p. 476). This view is reiterated repeatedly: for 
example, at A548/B576 Kant states that: 
 
‘… reason does not follow the order of things as they present themselves in appearance but frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to 
ideas, to which it adapts empirical conditions and according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they have never taken place, and perhaps 
never will take place’. 
 
This, then, is the famous doctrine of the causality of reason (sometimes also termed by Kant the causality of freedom), a 
causality that not only generates ‘an order of its own’ but also ‘adapts’ empirical conditions to this causality. 
 
Kant’s concept of the intelligible, is not, of course, without its problems. Even Kant’s early critics professed themselves at a 
loss to comprehend the bifurcation of the person into what appears to be two selves, the empirical and the intelligible (see Allison, 
1990, p. 29). Yet if these problems can be addressed we have indeed a rich prize: the idea of freedom as the power to initiate events, 
to formulate ideas and to start new beginnings. I term this kind of freedom ‘formative freedom’ because it indicates the power not 
only to set off a causal chain through actions but also the ability to set off causal chains in the realm of ideas. Formative freedom 
lies at the heart of education since it is this freedom that has the ability or power to put the products of learning to question and to 
generate and form ideas and perspectives that go beyond learning. It is, I think, worth seeing if the difficulties of Kant’s position 
can be confronted and, if not ‘solved’ then at least diminished. 
 
If the idea of a causality of reason and its relationship to freedom is not simply to be asserted but argued for, then I think we 
have little choice but to enter the thickets of Kantian ontology. This may enable a defensible account of freedom to emerge. The 
implications for education will be picked up again towards the end of this section when the idea of instrumental freedom is 
introduced. 
 
The first problem that confronts us is Kant’s seemingly unswerveable attachment to the idea that the realm of appearances is 
subject to strict causality. For although Kant insists that reason is ‘determining, not determinable’ he also insists that ‘if we could 
exhaustively investigate all the appearance’s of men’s wills, there would not be found a single human action which we could not 
 
6 The rise of the learner has been discussed by Gert Biesta extensively through the use of the term ‘learnification’— 
see Biesta, 2010, p. 76 and Biesta, 2010, p. 18–19. I have greatly benefitted from this analysis although when 
Biesta suggests in his 2010 publication that the rise of learnification may also contain ‘emancipatory possibilities 
… to the extent that it may empower individuals to take control of their own educational agenda’, I frankly 
doubt this. I pick up on this theme again in the final section of this paper. 
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predict with certainty, and recognise as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions’ (A550/578). This does seem wholly 
uncompromising. Kant is not just saying that we could explain empirically all actions/events post hoc; he is also saying that in the 
realm of appearances we could, in principle, predict with certainty what will happen in the future if we have enough information. 
What are we to make of this? 
 
One approach is that of Jonathan Bennett, a widely read scholar of Kant, who asks us simply to accept the fact that at this 
point Kant is being incoherent (Bennett, 1984). One simply cannot reconcile the determinism of the empirical realm with the 
causality of freedom in the intelligible and this comment might be enough if we were to regard Kant’s ideas of antiquarian interest 
only. But if we wish to see Kant as still having something to say to us then this ‘solution’ must be a last resort because it would 
mean that confronted by what appears to be a radical incompatibilism between freedom and causality we are simply to shrug our 
shoulders. 
 
A different approach to the problem of the apparent disjunction between the two realms would be to maintain that the 
empirical and the intelligible in effect designate different ontological worlds so that the causality of reason is assigned to the 
intelligible world and the causality of nature to the empirical world. But whilst this would ensure that events in one world were 
unaffected by events in the other—so that freedom would play out in an untrammelled way unaffected by the other world (and vice- 
versa) —this metaphysics clearly goes well beyond Kant for whom the question of addressing the role of freedom in a natural world 
driven by causality was a problem to be addressed, not to be spirited away under the aegis of an implausible metaphysical dualism.7 
 
But instead of a duality of ‘worlds’ one could embrace a duality of perspectives but whose narratives describe and account 
for objects and events that inhabit the same world.8 Thus a promising way of understanding the idea of the intelligible (at least from 
the standpoint of freedom) involves the realisation that freedom cannot be equated to an object of knowledge. From an 
epistemological perspective our knowledge of appearances is mediated through the forms of sensibility and through the operation of 
the understanding by means of the deployment of the categories. But the doctrine of freedom that Kant is proposing is dependent on 
a switch of perspectives, from the epistemic to the agentic. Thus we can experience the power of our freedom and witness its effects 
but we cannot know our freedom from the outside. From the agentic perspective, there is nothing corresponding to appearances that 
helps to establish the possibility of objective knowledge of freedom from an epistemic perspective. Nevertheless it is this agentic 
capability that ensures we are not subject to empirical causality in the way in which a physical event might be.9 Even if, from the 
empirical perspective (to switch perspectives back to the epistemic) these events can be explained in terms of a causal chain this 
does not detract from the efficacy of the agentic perspective. What this means, I think, is that although we may well be able to 
explain events post-hoc, the power of freedom (especially its power to initiate new beginnings) entails that we cannot predict 
human actions with any reliability. 
 
But what this also means is that we must depart from Kant’s hard determinism as outlined in the passage from the Critique, 
quoted above (A550/B578). If freedom is to make a difference—and the difference I am thinking of here is the power to think 
differently, the power of dialogue and the ability to change the minds of others as well as oneself—then it must be the case that we 
have to accept that not all actions and thoughts can be predicted, even if we were in full possession of information. But from this, it 
need not follow that an empirical cause is not sufficient for its effect. It is not that the actions of agents have the power to override 
laws established by physics, for example. Nor does it mean that we could not explain in physical terms, actions that have already 
occurred. It simply means that when it comes to the predictability of actions in physical terms we are prepared to hedge our bets and 
concede that freedom and hard determinism are not compatible. 
 
This last claim is disputed through a sophisticated piece of reasoning. Thus according to Hud Hudson we can show that 
freedom and causality of the natural world (in the sense outlined by Kant, i.e. ‘hard’ determinism) are compatible. There are two 
strands to his claim. The first concerns an account of human agency along the lines of Donald Davidson’s pro-attitude belief model: 
 
 
 
7 The ‘two worlds’ thesis is discussed by Hudson, 1994, pp. 33–34 and by Allison, 1990, Ch. 1 and 3. 
 
8 Discussed by Allison, 1990, p. 43. 
 
9 For instance, the causality outlined in the Second Analogy of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
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‘Under this model, an agent selects from among alternative means-end relations, furnished by pure or empirical practical reason, the selection being dependent on a 
belief in the propositional representation of the means to some end which has been conceptualised by the agent and for which the agent has some (rational or 
sensuous) desire’ (Hudson, 1994, p. 42). 
 
The second strand is an affirmation that a free action is ‘productive only by being token-token identical to an event that is the 
effect of some natural cause’ (p. 44) by which is meant that mental events are not reducible to physical events but that nonetheless 
they can be seen as ‘tracking’ the physical.10 
 
We can also see the relationship between these two strands because the belief of the agent is stimulated by some ‘cause’ in 
the form of the having of a mental desire which itself can be grounded in the empirical realm (for example, by giving a neurological 
account of the belief): this gives us the requisite token-token identity. 
 
My objection to Hudson’s account is clear:11 the kind of freedom outlined here is not the same as the kind of formative 
freedom which I am concerned to develop in this paper. It is an anaemic, toothless freedom which falls well short of the powers 
associated with the kind of agent activity that can initiate events and set off new beginnings. It is important to understand that 
beliefs are not simply propositions related to some desired purpose, for we have beliefs about our beliefs as well. These second 
order beliefs may provide a broader context in which first order beliefs operate. For example, my beliefs about the relevance of 
Kant for our times are set against a wider context of beliefs concerning an unwillingness to let go of the narrative of the 
Enlightenment. This play between first and second order beliefs and their reciprocal interrogation lies at the heart of formative 
freedom. 
 
A further problem associated with Kant’s concept of freedom is his view that the realm of the intelligible is timeless and 
therefore has no history: “Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time.” (Kant, p. 475,  A551). 
Many scholars have commented on the incoherence of this position (Hudson, 1994 and Bennett, 1984 are representative examples) 
on the grounds that an event cannot be both outside time (qua intelligible) and inside time (qua empirical) at one and the same 
‘time’ because the concept of ‘same’ is meaningless (in theory the event qua intelligible could occur before or after its empirical 
counterpart). The ‘timeless’ thesis is forced on Kant because he is unable to maintain that the realm of the intelligible can be caught 
up in the sequencing of events that provide the foundation of his analysis of causality in the Second Analogy. Any detailed solution 
of this problem lies outside the scope of this paper but the starting point would need to be along the following lines: a) free actions 
are timeless in the sense that they are not subject to empirical succession and causality (otherwise there could never be an initiation 
of something new), but b) that there is a time order in which agency is subject to succession but not causality. This ‘solution’ 
would, in effect, decouple succession in time from causality so that we can say that there are at least some events (i.e. those initiated 
by free agents) which happen in time but which are underdetermined as far as physical causation is concerned. 
 
Henry Allison (p. 45) suggests that Kant’s idea of freedom is regulatory: ‘the transcendental idea of freedom … has a merely 
regulative, non explanatory function … by providing a model of deliberative rationality’ (e.g. through the use of maxims to guide 
actions). But in invoking Kant’s insights in the development of what I term formative freedom I am suggesting that the regulative 
function is expanded to include ideas and meanings which transform not only the conceptual landscape but also transform the agent 
in the process through the development (and discarding) of beliefs. Being free involves the ability to transform one’s own beliefs 
and to calibrate these beliefs both through empirical testing and through dialogue with others. Thus we grant that although agent 
activity is enmeshed and entangled with the empirical it is still transcendental in the sense that the agent projects possibilities that 
are formulated conditional on what is given at any moment but that these givens include the agent’s own beliefs which, through 
agentic reflective activity are subject to transformation. 
 
Thus far I have discussed what I term ‘formative freedom’. But Kant also suggests that there is another kind of freedom, 
different but related to the freedom associated with the causality of reason. This conception is more straightforward and familiar. In 
the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ in the Critique Kant distinguishes between beings whose actions are necessitated by sensuous impulses 
and those (such as humans) that are merely pathologically affected by sensuous impulses (but not actually necessitated). He goes on 
to say: 
 
10 Hudson is drawing on features of Davidson’s account of anomalous monism (see Davidson, 1980). 
 
11 Although I should make it clear that I have benefitted greatly from his book. 
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We have the power to overcome the impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, by calling up representations of what, in a more direct manner, is useful or 
injurious. But these considerations, as to what is desirable in respect of our whole state, that is, as to what is good or useful, are based on reason’ (A802/B830, p. 
633). 
 
This is often termed practical freedom as opposed to transcendental freedom because the agent is guided by perceptions of 
what seems good or useful (see, for example, Allison, 1990, p. 207) Since choices need to be made and reason is employed in 
framing what could be useful in the light of desires (that may be conflicting) then freedom is still involved; but the kind of creative 
activity associated with transcendental freedom (i.e. what I have termed formative freedom) is lacking. This kind of freedom is 
recognisably ‘instrumental’ in that given certain ends, the agent works out the best means to attain them. But the ends themselves 
may be taken as ‘givens’ which it is beyond the capacity of instrumental freedom to call into question; for this is the task of 
formative freedom. It should be emphasised that instrumental freedom still requires actions that are voluntary despite its restricted 
scope. Hence it is, of course, possible to abrogate instrumental freedom through direct coercion by forcing someone to undertake 
actions and behaviours that are alleged to be in their interests or against those interests, as the case may be. 
 
THE ROLE OF FREEDOM IN EDUCATION AND LEARNING 
 
I have already suggested that it is formative freedom that lies at the heart of education and it will be seen that it is 
instrumental freedom that drives learning (cognitive training) as I have described it in the first section. For assuredly, this learning 
can only be effective if it is undertaken voluntarily and if this voluntariness characterises every stage. There is little prospect of 
training—of encouraging the appropriate kind of cognitive behaviours—if the principle driver is coercion. But note how the learning 
process sets up proxy goals, through the deployment of learning outcomes and the ends of assessment, of Kantian practical freedom 
(what I term instrumental freedom) along the lines of useful and satisfying ends, analogous to the goals furnished through desires 
and wants. The learning process itself sets up these behaviours with the expectation that the instrumental freedom of learners will, 
in varying degrees, fulfil through voluntary actions the required achievements. But note also that those who choose not to exercise 
their instrumental freedom risk—nay, guarantee—the stigma of failure. The desire to avoid failure and what is nearly as bad— 
under-achievement—can usually be relied on to ensure that learners exercise their instrumental freedom in order to achieve the 
goals prescribed for them. 
 
By contrast, formative freedom—which drives educational activity—takes failure in its stride. It recognises that freedom 
involves the freedom to fail. In the first section it was suggested that education can be characterised as that which puts learning to 
question. But this is only one side of formative freedom. Through the causality of reason new ideas and perspectives are generated 
on the basis of this critique; but since those ideas are themselves put to question then the likelihood of ‘failure’ is always present. 
New ideas and perspectives are never valid merely because they are innovative. But the idea that failure is to be welcomed is 
entirely foreign to the process of learning (for example, it is hugely feared by students), construed as cognitive training. And 
because the process of learning eschews critique it is always vulnerable to whatever claim to innovation comes along. Since 
learning never puts itself to question the ‘what’ to be learned can become entirely arbitrary. Learning is equally at home with the 
comforting truths of disciplinary knowingness as it is with the latest claims to ‘new’ knowledge (often garnered from the internet). 
Gradually the process of learning itself starts to assume a dominance over the ‘what’ is learnt. As mere content, the latter falls 
away, to be displaced by the endless monotony of busy tasks which are designed to fill time and to justify the existence of those 
enmeshed in its machinery. 
 
I mentioned earlier that there are different ways of learning (e.g. informal learning) and not all learning takes the form of 
cognitive training. For example, there is that venerable form of learning—learning as scholarship—which is different from cognitive 
training in this respect: the practice of scholarship is characterised by a self-effacement in which the ego of the scholar is placed at 
the service of scholarly discoveries and disquisitions (thus scholarship is not learner-centred). Whilst its high point in Europe was 
perhaps several hundred years ago (i.e. the revival of classical humanism in the 15th and 16th centuries12) it has, of course never 
 
12 Stephen Greenblatt’s The Swerve contains a fascinating account of the discovery of the manuscript of Lucretius’s 
De Rerum Naturae in 1417 by Poggio Bracciolini. Yet Greenblatt as well as bringing to our attention the 
indefatigability and heroism of this Renaissance scholar also shows us his creative limitations as well—the 
limitations inherent in learning. 
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disappeared. By contrast, the learning that takes the form of training naturally places the learner at the centre of the process and 
rightly so, because it is she who is being shaped, moulded and groomed through a process akin to dressage.13 
 
At this point a protest may be raised: in life outside of educational processes, our conduct typically can be characterised in 
terms of both instrumental and formative freedom; surely education is similarly characterised by the judicious combination of both 
types of freedom as well. To which my answer is: not quite. I agree that educational processes will include elements of learning— 
not only scholarly learning but also cognitive training. But I insist that both types of learning (as species of instrumental freedom) 
must be subordinated to formative freedom, to education as critique. 
 
We get a clear, unalloyed statement of what is needed, I think, in Kant’s short pamphlet, What is Enlightenment? published 
in 1784, in which he pronounces that ‘Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’ (Kant, 1970, p. 54). 
The essential passages in Kant are well worth quoting in full because I think that in these conservative times it is easy to forget what 
we, as teachers, are about: 
 
Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self- 
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! “Have 
courage to use your own reason!” —that is the motto of enlightenment … For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and is indeed the most 
harmless among all the things to which this term can properly be applied. It is the freedom to make public use of one's reason at every point. But I hear on all sides, 
“Do not argue!” The Officer says: “Do not argue but drill!” The tax collector: “Do not argue but pay!” The cleric: “Do not argue but believe!” … Everywhere there 
is restriction on freedom (Kant, 1970, p. 54–55). 
 
Kant goes on to emphasise the intrinsic relationship between freedom and its deployment in public space: 
 
… the freedom to make public use of one’s freedom in all matters … the public use of man’s freedom must always be free and it alone can bring enlightenment 
among men (Kant, 1970, p. 55). 
 
If we were to take Kant seriously today, what would the educational landscape in higher education look like? I suggest the 
following possibilities: 
 
1. There would be greater emphasis on the creativity of ideas and students (and academics) would see 
their role less in terms of private learning and much more in terms of public critique. For example, 
they might worry less about the apparatus of academic scholarship. I have myself seen students 
hampered and cramped by the perceived requirement that every written statement and assertion 
must be backed by a scholarly reference. This tyranny of learning inhibits students from expressing 
their own opinions; indeed, it encourages a fear of speaking out in the absence of supposed scholarly 
back-up. 
2. When student work is assessed, learning outcomes act only as a guide. Assessment that is driven by 
learning outcomes will be discouraged as mean, limiting and disrespectful to the student in respect of 
her formative freedom—her freedom to critique learning, including learning outcomes. 
3. Students will no longer be referred to a ‘learners’ but will only be referred to as students (or better, as 
participants) understood as co-investigators with their tutors into disciplinary understanding. The 
learner culture will be displaced by a culture in which tutors welcome their students as co-participants 
into a shared practice of learning, investigation and creation. 
4. A key ingredient of formative freedom is the role of judgement and students will be introduced to the 
nature of academic judgement early on. They will learn that the creation of ideas is driven by 
judgements which identify deficits or inadequacies in theories, interpretations and evidence; and they 
will learn also that judgements are nearly always provisional and often wrong.14 But, in addition, 
 
 
13 See Foucault, 1980 for the use of this term in respect of ‘disciplining’ the self. 
 
14 I am well aware that the business of academic judgement requires another paper on its own. 
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students will learn that judgements themselves may be more or less informed, taking into account 
normative considerations as well as the deliverances of disciplinary knowledge. They will learn how to 
recognise poor judgement and how to make their own judgements as well. 
Of these four features it is perhaps the last one that has the most importance—the centrality of judgement in the academic 
process. This contributes to the growth not of a learner culture in which the focus is on the learner but a culture of education in 
which neither student not tutor is privileged but where both work together, as free spirits. 
 
NOTES 
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